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ABSTRACT
Background As general practice becomes increas-
ingly computerised, data security becomes increas-
ingly important for both patient health and the
eﬃcient operation of the practice.
Objective To develop guidelines for computer
security in general practice based on a literature
review, an analysis of available information on
current practice and a series of key stakeholder
interviews. While the guideline was produced in
the context of Australian general practice, we have
developed a template that is also relevant for other
countries.
Method Current data on computer security meas-
ures was sought from Australian divisions of general
practice. Semi-structured interviews were con-
ducted with general practitioners (GPs), the medi-
cal software industry, senior managers within
government responsible for health IT (information
technology) initiatives, technical IT experts, div-
isions of general practice and a member of a health
information consumer group. The respondents were
asked to assess both the likelihood and the conse-
quences of potential risks in computer security
being breached.
Results The study suggested that the most import-
ant computer security issues in general practice
were: the need for a nominated IT security co-
ordinator; having written IT policies, including a
practice disaster recovery plan; controlling access to
diﬀerent levels of electronic data; doing and testing
backups; protecting against viruses and other mal-
icious codes; installing ﬁrewalls; undertaking routine
maintenance of hardware and software; and secur-
ing electronic communication, for example via
encryption. This information led to the production
of computer security guidelines, including a one-
page summary checklist, which were subsequently
distributed to all GPs in Australia.
Conclusions This paper maps out a process for
developing computer security guidelines for general
practice. The speciﬁc content will vary in diﬀerent
countries according to their levels of adoption of
IT, and cultural, technical and other health service
factors. Making these guidelines relevant to local
contexts should help maximise their uptake.
Keywords: computer security, general practice,
guidelines
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Background
Information security has been deﬁned as a process for
ensuring the conﬁdentiality, integrity and accessibility
of electronic data.1–9 In general practice, data refer to
clinical, demographic and ﬁnancial information, and
keeping these secure is important for both patient
health and the eﬃcient running of a practice.
Australian general practice is becoming increas-
ingly computerised. By the year 2000, almost 90% of
practices were using computers, particularly for ad-
ministrative tasks.10 The proportion of practices using
clinical software is not known exactly, but it is
estimated that 80–90% of GPs use computers for
generating prescriptions.11
This paper outlines the principles of developing
computer security guidelines for family medicine/
general practice. The authors recognise that GPs in
other countriesmight choose to adapt these principles
to accommodate local circumstances depending on
cultural, technological and health service factors.
However, our study could provide a useful template
for the development of such guidelines in other
countries.
Methods
Several strategies were used by Peter Schattner and
Catherine Pleteshner to develop computer security
guidelines for Australian general practice.
Reviewing the literature on computer
security in the health industry
A literature review was undertaken with Medline,
ProQuest andGoogle.Various keywordswere employed
including combinations of computer security, infor-
mation security, general practice, information tech-
nology (and IT), computers, training doctors, health
informatics and doctors and the internet. Non-research
literature was also reviewed, particularly the guidelines
produced by Standards Australia and the draft guide-
lines on computer security developed by the Australian
GeneralPracticeComputingGroup(GPCG) in2001.1–9,12
Reviewing existing data from surveys
in general practice
Australia has 118 divisions of general practice; these
are regional organisations funded by the Australian
Government to support general practice. InDecember
2003, all of these divisions were contacted to see if
they had undertaken surveys on computer security
among their GP members. Only three divisions were
in a position to provide comprehensive survey infor-
mation.
Interviewing key stakeholders
We conducted 14 key informant telephone interviews,
which included GPs (4), a representative of the medi-
cal software industry association, government rep-
resentatives (3), experts in IT (3), relevant staﬀ from
divisions of general practice (2) and one member of a
health information consumer group. The consumer
representative had experience with health IT, and the
three government representatives included nominated
senior managers responsible for the management and
implementation of key Australian Government health
IT initiatives.
The objectives of the interviews were to:
. conduct a risk assessment on the likelihood and
consequences of breaches in computer security in
general practice
. obtain risk management advice
. obtain suggestions for the implementation of se-
curity guidelines in Australian general practice and
identify potential barriers to their uptake.
An interview schedule was developed to meet these
objectives by reviewing the literature, with particular
reference to publications by Standards Australia and
the earlier GPCG draft IT security guidelines.1–9,12
The views of each key informant were transcribed and
arranged according to the themes outlined in the
original, semi-structured interview framework. The
identities of the respondents have beenkept conﬁdential.
Computer security risks have been divided into
organisational and technical ones. The interviewees
were ﬁrst asked to consider what would be the likely
consequences to both the patient and the practice if a
risk were realised. The following scale was used:
Consequences (magnitude)
. High – ofmajor signiﬁcance to the business or to the
patient
. Medium– important, but not of critical importance
. Low– anuisance, but can copewith this without too
much diﬃculty
The interviewees were also asked to comment on the
likelihood of nominated and other technical risks
occurring. They were asked to make this assessment
on the basis of not only their own experience but also
on their observations when assisting colleagues, and
through insight gained by other exchanges within
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the profession. The following working deﬁnitions for
likelihood were used:
Likelihood
. High – very likely to occur within the next 12
months
. Medium – might occur within 12 months
. Low – not very likely to occur within 12 months
Both patient and practice business risks were taken
into account, and risk management included a con-
sideration of the cost of preventing a breach in
security.
Results
Literature review
A search of the peer-reviewed literature on computer
security in general practice revealed virtually no articles
based on original research. A few papers described
overseas studies in nursing, specialist medicine or
hospital settings, none of which necessarily applied
to Australian general practice. The vast majority of the
articles were reviews. Computer security guidelines to
date have generally been based on ‘expert opinion’
rather than quantitative risk assessments.13–16 For
example, information published on the reasons why
GPs should encrypt electronic data before transmis-
sion elsewhere does not give any evidence on how
often problems have arisen by not encrypting.17
Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the secur-
ity of patient information is important for the proper
ethical, legal and professional functioning of the
practice.18 Unfortunately, there are several threats to
this security in general practice, including GP use of
the internet.19 The relationship between conﬁdenti-
ality of personal health information and the use of
computers and the internet was raised by the Australia
National Health Information Management Advisory
Council in 2001.20 The Privacy Commissioner reported
that many Australians believe there is less privacy now
than there has been in previous years and that com-
puters make it easier for conﬁdential information to
fall into the wrong hands.21 As a consequence, policies
are needed to guide processing, receiving, modifying,
disseminating, sending, storing anddisposingofpatient-
related healthcare data.16 The Australian Government
has responded by passing the Privacy Amendment
(Private Sector) Act 2000 which addresses the need to
safeguard personal information in the private sector.22
This applies as much to paper records as it does to
electronic ones in medical practice.
Information security is not simply a technical or
legal issue.13 Compliance with guidelines depends to a
large extent onmedical practitioners and practice staﬀ
believing in the value of the data they hold. A culture of
security might encourage health professionals to de-
velop appropriate IT policies and procedures.13
Australian surveys on data security
There are few surveys on computer security in
Australian general practice, and poor response rates
characterise those that exist. Nevertheless, a few studies
have been published and these raise concerns about
the adequacy of computer security procedures (see
Table 1).
The surveys reveal that, to date, written IT policies
and procedures, as well as the appointment of IT co-
ordinators within practices, have not been widely
adopted. Although most practices back up their data,
they do not often check that these backups have
worked. Further, most practices are not conﬁdent that
they adequately understand the technical aspects of
backingup.Planning for computerdisasters also appears
to be inadequate. User access control (through the use
of passwords) is not strictly adhered to, and other
basic protective procedures, such as the correct use of
anti-virus software and ﬁrewalls, are of concern. Un-
fortunately, it appears that practices have been un-
willing to spend suﬃcient money to obtain adequate
professional IT support.
Information based on key informant
interviews
The consensus from the interviewees was that the
most important issue in computer security in general
practice is the backing up of data. Other important
issues raised included physical and internet security
(ﬁrewalls, anti-virus solutions and encryption) and
the conﬁdentiality of patient records. Further, a num-
ber of GPs observed that most general practices were
relatively small businesses, and many had limited in-
house knowledge of, or expertise in, computer security,
which was therefore considered somewhat beyond
their reach.
Questions were asked on speciﬁc aspects of IT
security as follows:
Organisational aspects (see Table 2)
IT POLICIES IN THE PRACTICE
The importance of a practice developing an IT policy
was recognised:
‘In my experience, where there are no IT policies there
is generally no IT focus ... there is no investment in
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Table 1 Australian general practice surveys on data security
IT policies and
procedures
(% of practices)
Backup
procedure
Anti-virus and
ﬁrewall protection
Passwords Awareness of
computer risks
78% have an IT
co-ordinator
(a GP in 47%)23
77% back up data
daily25
76% have anti-
virus software24
69% do not have
passwords to login
to computers25
Majority are not
conﬁdent about
their knowledge of
backup
procedures26
61% have written
IT disaster plan23
69% have tested
their backups at
some stage24
60% do not have
this software on
every computer in
the practice26
51% do not have
passwords to login
to clinical
software25
Some practices that
are conﬁdent do
not have adequate
data safety
procedures26
<50% have formal
written IT policies
and procedures24
47% were unsure if
all important ﬁles
on network were
backed up26
29% do not update
anti-virus software
regularly26
Cost is a major
factor preventing
practices from
obtaining expert
advice from
commercial IT
services for data
security4
54% have an
uninterruptible
power supply
(mainly for
server)23
69% of practices
with internet
connections did
not have ﬁrewalls26
Table 2 IT security risks in general practice – organisational aspects
Risk analysis Potential magnitude of risk
Organisational risks High Medium Low No direct
answer given*
Practice IT policy
Risk to the patient 6 2 2 4
Risk to the business 7 3 0 4
IT practice co-ordinator
Risk to the patient 2 5 3 4
Risk to the business 8 2 0 4
Practice disaster plan
Risk to the patient 3 3 3 5
Risk to the business 6 4 0 4
Practice email and internet policies
Risk to the patient 7 0 2 5
Risk to the business 7 2 1 4
*Respondents from the government sector either indicated that they were not in a position to make an informed comment or
expressed their reticence to do so.
Computer security in general practice 77
developing a proper IT system ... you end up with a dog’s
breakfast of bits and pieces that don’t work.’ (GP, inter-
view transcript: original emphasis)
PRACTICE IT CO-ORDINATOR
Similarly, most respondents felt that having an IT co-
ordinator was important, especially for the business
aspects of general practice.
PRACTICE DISASTER PLAN
Disaster plans are required when the computer system
‘goes down’. Respondents indicated that they thought
there was considerable risk in not having a practice
disaster plan. They considered it vital to have an
alternative system in place whereby they could keep
booking and treating patients.
‘Start with a basic immediate computer disaster plan ...
you don’t need a lot ... a bit of training anddocumentation
for how to deal with the front desk issues for example ...
such as when patients come in and the computers aren’t
working ... the immediate problem is to get patients seen,
to get bookings made ... have money taken, invoiced and
receipted ... it’s simple ... use a paper-based system.’ (GP,
interview transcript: original emphasis)
EMAIL AND INTERNET POLICIES
Most respondents considered that there was a sub-
stantial risk to both patients and the practice from not
having practice-wide email and internet policies.
However, some thought that as there was currently
limiteduse of email and the internet for clinical purposes,
the actual risk is likely to be low for the time being.
ACCESS RIGHTS TO DATA
A clear protocol on who has access to which data is
essential to reduce the risk of inappropriate access
to information, both clinical and ﬁnancial. However,
most thought that compliance with national privacy
legislation was cumbersome and costly.
Technical aspects (see Table 3)
BACKUPS AND RESTORATIONS
The respondents felt that there was a reasonable
likelihood of backups failing. The risks to both patients
and the business were considered to be of major
signiﬁcance although diﬃcult to quantify. There were
considerable monetary implications for GPs not
having eﬀective data backup strategies in place.
SCREEN SAVERS
Respondents considered the lack of screen savers to be
a relatively low risk to both patients and the business.
The main risk was in terms of litigation for breach of
conﬁdentiality.
PASSWORDS
A number of GP respondents explained that the
widespread failure by GPs and their practice staﬀ to
use passwords was as a result of a high degree of
mutual trust. One commented that although each
individual GP in the practice had his/her own pass-
word, these were collected by one of the practice staﬀ
and then written on a piece of paper that was hung up
in the back oﬃce area. It also appeared that as the size
of practices increased, so did the risk of a breach in
security associated with passwords.
MALICIOUS CODE AND FIREWALLS
Not protecting computers against malicious code
(such as viruses) was generally thought to pose a high
risk, particularly to the business. This was especially so
where GPs and practice staﬀ regularly accessed the
internet. Rectifying the ensuing problems such as
computer crashes was costly, time-consuming and
disruptive to the day-to-day operations of the prac-
tice. One GP commented on one such experience:
‘The system was down for some time ... it took quite a lot
of time to eradicate the viruses ... some of them are very
diﬃcult to get rid of.’ (GP, interview transcript)
Respondents varied in their assessment of the magni-
tude of risk to the patient, some considering this to be
minimal.
POWER SURGES
Power surges were thought to be more likely in rural
rather than metropolitan settings, and the magnitude
of risk was considered greater for the business than for
patients.
ENCRYPTION OF DATA
Respondents reiterated the generally-held view of the
need to encrypt patient data for electronic transmis-
sion beyond the practice. The risk of not doing so was
thought to be considerable, particularly for breaches
of patient conﬁdentiality; however, litigation was also
a possible outcome of breaches to privacy. It was noted
that only a minority of practices had adopted the
Australian Government’s freely available encryption
solution – Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
P Schattner, C Pleteshner, H Bhend et al78
‘We don’t have, as a practice, any particular organised
approach to encryption of things like specialists’ letters.’
(GP, interview transcript)
OTHER TECHNICAL RISKS
Two other areas of risk identiﬁed were:
. doctors trying to tinker with their computer systems
beyond their levels of expertise
. not replacing ageing IT infrastructure until some
part of it failed.
The risk analysis (summarised in Table 4) revealed the
priority ratings for organisational and technical se-
curity risks for Australian general practice. Protection
against malicious code and the use of ﬁrewalls were
rated as high priorities, as were the need for IT policies
and disaster recovery plans. The use of screen savers,
protection against power surges and the use of en-
cryption were considered low priority.
Discussion
This paper reports on the development of a set
of computer security guidelines in Australia. These
Table 3 IT security risks in general practice – technical aspects
Risk analysis Likelihood and potential magnitude of risk
Technical risks High Medium Low No direct
answer given*
Backups
Likelihood of failure 6 1 3 4
Risk to the patient 4 1 4 5
Risk to the business 6 1 1 6
Screen savers
Likelihood of failure 3 0 5 6
Risk to the patient 0 2 3 9
Risk to the business 0 1 5 8
Passwords
Likelihood of failure 4 2 2 6
Risk to the patient 4 0 2 8
Risk to the business 4 2 1 7
Malicious code (e.g. viruses)
Likelihood of failure 8 0 2 4
Risk to the patient 3 2 4 5
Risk to the business 7 1 1 5
Firewalls
Likelihood of failure 7 0 0 7
Risk to the patient 5 2 0 7
Risk to the business 6 1 1 6
Power surges
Likelihood of failure 3 2 2 7
Risk to the patient 2 0 3 9
Risk to the business 5 1 1 7
Encryption of data transmission
Likelihood of failure 1 4 3 6
Risk to the patient 7 0 1 6
Risk to the business 5 4 0 5
*Respondents from the government sector indicated that they were not in a position to make an informed comment.
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guidelines were based on information from other
published guidelines, surveys which documented some
of the shortcomings in the adoption of computer
security measures, and the opinions of experts in the
Australian context. Unfortunately, little research has
previously been undertaken to justify how generic
computer security guidelines should be modiﬁed to
make them applicable to general practice. This study has
attempted to make these guidelines relevant to GPs,
and this should assist in their adoption.
The ﬁve surveys referred to provide some indication
of the extent of the problem of computer security in
Australian general practice, although the ﬁndings are
likely to be of limited accuracy. Most of these studies
had poor response rates (less than 50%) and did not
use validated data collection instruments. Further, it
is likely that considerable improvements have been
made to computer security practices even within the
few short years that have passed since these studies
were done. It is interesting that the ﬁndings of these
surveys are consistent with those that have been
undertaken in Switzerland and Belgium in 2006 by
two of the authors, Heinz Bhend and Johan Brouns.
These also suggest that GPs are not taking adequate
measures to ensure the security of data in their practices.
The information gathered in the context of Australian
general practice was used to produce guidelines which
can be accessed on www.gpcg.org. A summary check-
list was derived (see Table 5), which provides a simple,
one-page set of computer security items which GPs
can use to see if appropriate procedures have been put
in place. Ideally, the guidelines and summary checklist
should be evaluated in the ﬁeld to ﬁnd out just how
usable they are.
Nevertheless, as a place for others to start, this study
illuminates a set of principles that have been selected
and used to develop computer security guidelines for
general practice. These principles can be summarised
as follows:
. understand what has been developed to date within
one’s country and elsewhere (a literature review)
. understand the local issues (i.e. gather information
about current computer security problems and the
socio-technical barriers to overcoming them)
. ﬁnally, ask experts (GPs, those in the IT industry,
GP professional organisations, government and con-
sumers) what needs to be done and how best to do it.
Following, whilst adapting, these steps should help
other countries develop IT security guidelines which
are relevant to their own requirements.
Once such guidelines are produced, how can we
encourage GPs to adopt them? GPs will need incen-
tives, training and support. Respondents in this study
emphasised the importance of human factors over
purely technical solutions, for example, the need for a
practice to identify someone who co-ordinates secur-
ity issues, including ensuring practice staﬀ and GP
training.
The Australian Government has provided ﬁnancial
incentives to encourage GPs to adopt computer se-
curity measures in their practices. It has also funded
the nationwide distribution of the computer security
guidelines referred to in this paper. These guidelines
Table 4 Experts’ priorities for management of IT security risks
Risk to be addressed Prioritisation
High Medium Low
IT policies in the practice 7 3 0
Practice IT co-ordinator 6 3 0
Disaster plan 7 3 0
Email and internet policies 6 1 2
Backups (restorations) 7 0 1
Screen savers 1 3 4
Passwords 3 5 0
Malicious code (e.g. viruses) 8 1 0
Firewalls 8 1 0
Power surges 3 2 2
Encryption of transmitted data 3 3 2
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Table 5 General Practice Computing Group computer security checklist
IT category Tasks Has this been
implemented?
(tick if yes)
Practice computer security
co-ordinator
Practice IT security co-ordinator’s role description
written
&
Practice IT security co-ordinator appointed &
IT security training for co-ordinator provided &
Security co-ordinator’s role reviewed (at speciﬁed
intervals)
&
Practice IT security policies and
procedures
Person(s) (e.g. IT security co-ordinator) appointed
to document (and revise) security policies and
procedures (can be part of practice manual)
&
IT security policies and procedures documented &
IT security policies and procedures documentation
reviewed (at speciﬁed intervals)
&
Staﬀ trained in IT security policies and procedures &
Access control Staﬀ policy developed on levels of electronic access
to data and systems
&
Staﬀ have created personal passwords to access
appropriate level
&
Passwords are kept secure &
Consideration given to changing passwords
periodically
&
Disaster recovery plan Disaster recovery plan developed &
Disaster recovery plan tested (at speciﬁed intervals) &
Disaster recovery plan updated (at speciﬁed intervals) &
Backups Backups of data done daily &
Backups of data stored oﬀsite &
Backup procedure tested (by performing a
restoration of data) at speciﬁed intervals
&
Backup procedure has been included in a
documented disaster recovery plan
&
Viruses Anti-viral software installed on all computers &
Automatic updating of viral deﬁnitions enabled
(daily if possible)
&
Staﬀ trained in anti-viral measures as documented
in policies and procedures manual
&
Firewalls Hardware and/or software ﬁrewalls installed &
Hardware and/or software ﬁrewalls tested &
Network maintenance Computer hardware and software maintained
in optimal condition (includes physical security,
eﬃcient performance of computer programs,
and program upgrades and patches)
&
Uninterruptible power supply installed
(to at least the server)
&
Secure electronic communication Encryption systems considered &
Encryption used for the electronic transfer of
conﬁdential information
&
Source: GPCG computer security project#GPCG February 2004 (This checklist should be used in conjunction with the GPCG
computer security guidelines which describe each item in more detail. www.gpcg.org.au/images/stories/pdfs/publications/docs/
2004Phase1Proj/SecurityGuidelines.pdf)
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and accompanying templates are available at no charge
on the internet (www.gpcg.org). Finally, the Royal
Australian College of General Practitioners has taken
up the majority of the suggestions described in the
guidelines and incorporated them into its Standards
for General Practice which form the basis for practice
accreditation in Australia.27
Other countries will need to adapt guideline im-
plementation strategies to suit their own healthcare
systems, the extent of adoption of information tech-
nologies and other organisational and political fac-
tors. The guidelines themselves will not be the same in
countries with advanced rather than basic IT systems
in health. For example, countries which already use
shared electronic health records will need to add
another layer of security. However, the principles of
how to develop guidelines are relevant to countries
that currently exhibit a range of IT practices within the
primary healthcare sector.
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